



AB-2542 Criminal procedure: discrimination. (2019-2020)

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Date Published: 10/02/2020 02:00 PM

Assembly Bill No. 2542

CHAPTER 317

An act to amend Sections 1473 and 1473.7 of, and to add Section 745 to, the Penal Code, relating to criminal procedure.

[Approved by Governor September 30, 2020. Filed with Secretary of State September 30, 2020.]

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 2542, Kalra. Criminal procedure: discrimination.

Existing law generally prescribes the procedure for the prosecution of persons arrested for committing a crime, including pleadings, bail, pretrial proceedings, trial, judgment, sentencing, and appeals. Existing law allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of their imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, among other things, relief based on the use of false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial.

This bill would prohibit the state from seeking a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin, as specified. The bill would allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of that prohibition, and would require the defendant to appear at the evidentiary hearing by video unless their presence in court is needed. The bill would permit a defendant to file a motion requesting disclosure of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of that prohibition that is in the possession or control of the prosecutor and would require a court, upon a showing of good cause, to order those records to be released. The bill would authorize a court that finds a violation of that prohibition to impose a remedy specified in the bill. The bill would apply its provisions to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system. The bill would apply its provisions only prospectively to cases in which judgment has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.

Existing law creates an explicit right for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a prejudicial error damaging to the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, as specified.

This bill would additionally allow for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a conviction or sentence that was sought, obtained, or imposed on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of the bill's provisions.

This bill would state that its provisions are severable.

Vote: majority Appropriation: no Fiscal Committee: yes Local Program: no

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the California Racial Justice Act of 2020.

SEC. 2. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(a) Discrimination in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, or national origin (hereafter “race” or “racial bias”) has a deleterious effect not only on individual criminal defendants but on our system of justice as a whole. The United States Supreme Court has said: “Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” (Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946))). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized “the impact of ... evidence [of racial bias] cannot be measured simply by how much air time it received at trial or how many pages it occupies in the record. Some toxins can be deadly in small doses.” (Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017)). Discrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice and deprives Californians of equal justice under law.

(b) A United States Supreme Court Justice has observed, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.” (Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary, 572 U.S. 291, 380-81 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). We cannot simply accept the stark reality that race pervades our system of justice. Rather, we must acknowledge and seek to remedy that reality and create a fair system of justice that upholds our democratic ideals.

(c) Even though racial bias is widely acknowledged as intolerable in our criminal justice system, it nevertheless persists because courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms. More and more judges in California and across the country are recognizing that current law, as interpreted by the high courts, is insufficient to address discrimination in our justice system. (State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d 34, 35 (2013); Ellis v. Harrison, 891 F.3d 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., concurring), reh’g en banc granted Jan. 30, 2019; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986); People v. Bryant, 40 Cal.App.5th 525 (2019) (Humes, J., concurring)). Even when racism clearly infects a criminal proceeding, under current legal precedent, proof of purposeful discrimination is often required, but nearly impossible to establish. For example, one justice on the California Court of Appeals recently observed the legal standards for preventing racial bias in jury selection are ineffective, observing that “requiring a showing of purposeful discrimination sets a high standard that is difficult to prove in any context.” (Bryant, 40 Cal.App.5th 525 (Humes, J., concurring)).

(d) Current legal precedent often results in courts sanctioning racism in criminal trials. Existing precedent countenances racially biased testimony, including expert testimony, and arguments in criminal trials. A court upheld a conviction based in part on an expert’s racist testimony that people of Indian descent are predisposed to commit bribery. (United States v. Shah, 768 Fed. Appx. 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2019)). Existing precedent has provided no recourse for a defendant whose own attorney harbors racial animus towards the defendant’s racial group, or toward the defendant, even where the attorney routinely used racist language and “harbor[ed] deep and utter contempt” for the defendant’s racial group (Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); id. at 939-40 (Graber, J., dissenting)). Existing precedent holds that appellate courts must defer to the rulings of judges who make racially biased comments during jury selection. (People v. Williams, 56 Cal. 4th 630, 652 (2013); see also id. at 700 (Liu, J., concurring)).

(e) Existing precedent tolerates the use of racially incendiary or racially coded language, images, and racial stereotypes in criminal trials. For example, courts have upheld convictions in cases where prosecutors have compared defendants who are people of color to Bengal tigers and other animals, even while acknowledging that such statements are “highly offensive and inappropriate” (Duncan v. Ornoski, 286 Fed. Appx. 361, 363 (9th Cir. 2008); see also People v. Powell, 6 Cal.5th 136, 182-83 (2018)). Because use of animal imagery is historically associated with racism, use of animal imagery in reference to a defendant is racially discriminatory and should not be permitted in our court system (Phillip Atiba Goff, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Melissa J. Williams, and Matthew Christian Jackson, Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2008) Vol. 94, No. 2, 292-293; Praatika Prasad, Implicit Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 Fordham Law Review, Volume 86, Issue 6, Article 24 3091, 3105-06 (2018)).

(f) Existing precedent also accepts racial disparities in our criminal justice system as inevitable. Most famously, in 1987, the United States Supreme Court found that there was “a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race” in death penalty cases in Georgia, but the court would not intervene without proof of a discriminatory

purpose, concluding that we must simply accept these disparities as “an inevitable part of our criminal justice system” (*McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 279, 295-99, 312 (1987)). In dissent, one Justice described this as “a fear of too much justice” (*Id.* at p. 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

(g) Current law, as interpreted by the courts, stands in sharp contrast to this Legislature’s commitment to “ameliorate bias-based injustice in the courtroom” subdivision (b) of Section 1 of Chapter 418 of the Statutes of 2019 (Assembly Bill 242). The Legislature has acknowledged that all persons possess implicit biases (*Id.* at Section 1(a)(1)), that these biases impact the criminal justice system (*Id.* at Section 1(a)(5)), and that negative implicit biases tend to disfavor people of color (*Id.* at Section 1(a)(3)-(4)). In California in 2020, we can no longer accept racial discrimination and racial disparities as inevitable in our criminal justice system and we must act to make clear that this discrimination and these disparities are illegal and will not be tolerated in California, both prospectively and retroactively.

(h) There is growing awareness that no degree or amount of racial bias is tolerable in a fair and just criminal justice system, that racial bias is often insidious, and that purposeful discrimination is often masked and racial animus disguised. The examples described here are but a few select instances of intolerable racism infecting decisionmaking in the criminal justice system. Examples of the racism that pervades the criminal justice system are too numerous to list.

(i) It is the intent of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI of the California Constitution, and violates the laws and Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although often unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar to intentional bias. The intent of the Legislature is not to punish this type of bias, but rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system. It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing. It is the intent of the Legislature to reject the conclusion that racial disparities within our criminal justice are inevitable, and to actively work to eradicate them.

(j) It is the further intent of the Legislature to provide remedies that will eliminate racially discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system, in addition to intentional discrimination. It is the further intent of the Legislature to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences.

SEC. 3. Section 745 is added to the Penal Code, immediately following Section 740, to read:

745. (a) The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:

(1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.

(2) During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful. This paragraph does not apply if the person speaking is describing language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.

(3) Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenges to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

(4) The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.

(5) (A) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently

imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.

(B) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, in the county where the sentence was imposed.

(b) A defendant may file a motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).

(c) If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing.

(1) At the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including, but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert.

(2) The defendant shall have the burden of proving a violation of subdivision (a) by a preponderance of the evidence.

(3) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make findings on the record.

(d) A defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. A motion filed under this subdivision shall describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks. Upon a showing of good cause, and if the records are not privileged, the court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.

(e) Notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the voters, if the court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the following list of remedies:

(1) Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose any of the following remedies:

(A) Reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge.

(B) Declare a mistrial, if requested by the defendant.

(C) Discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury.

(D) If the court determines that it would be in the interest of justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges.

(2) (A) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a). If the court finds that the only violation of subdivision (a) that occurred is based on paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) and the court has the ability to rectify the violation by modifying the judgment, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that the conviction is legally invalid, and modify the judgment to impose an appropriate remedy for the violation that occurred. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

(B) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

(3) When the court finds there has been a violation of subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.

(4) The remedies available under this section do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.

(f) This section also applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system.

(g) This section shall not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes pursuant to Sections 422.6 to 422.865, inclusive.

(h) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:

(1) "More frequently sought or obtained" or "more frequently imposed" means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.

(2) "Prima facie showing" means that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred. For purposes of this section, a "substantial likelihood" requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.

(3) "Racially discriminatory language" means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant's physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is discriminatory.

(4) "State" includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city prosecutor.

(i) A defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

(j) This section applies only prospectively in cases in which judgment has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.

SEC. 3.5. Section 745 is added to the Penal Code, immediately following Section 740, to read:

745. (a) The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:

(1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin.

(2) During the defendant's trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful. This paragraph does not apply if the person speaking is describing language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.

(3) The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.

(4) (A) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.

(B) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, in the county where the sentence was imposed.

(b) A defendant may file a motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).

(c) If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing.

(1) At the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including, but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert.

(2) The defendant shall have the burden of proving a violation of subdivision (a) by a preponderance of the evidence.

(3) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make findings on the record.

(d) A defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. A motion filed under this section shall describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks. Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, and if the records are not privileged, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.

(e) Notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the voters, if the court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the following list:

(1) Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose any of the following remedies:

(A) Declare a mistrial, if requested the by defendant.

(B) Discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury.

(C) If the court determines that it would be in the interest of justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges.

(2) (A) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a). If the court finds that the only violation of subdivision (a) that occurred is based on paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) and the court has the ability to rectify the violation by modifying the judgment, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that the conviction is legally invalid, and modify the judgment to impose an appropriate remedy for the violation that occurred. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

(B) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

(3) When the court finds there has been a violation of subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.

(4) The remedies available under this section do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.

(f) This section also applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system.

(g) This section shall not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes pursuant to Sections 422.6 to 422.865, inclusive.

(h) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:

(1) "More frequently sought or obtained" or "more frequently imposed" means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.

(2) "Prima facie showing" means that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred. For purposes of this section, a "substantial likelihood" requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.

(3) "Racially discriminatory language" means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant's physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is discriminatory.

(4) "State" includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city prosecutor.

(i) A defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

(j) This section applies only prospectively in cases in which judgment has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.

SEC. 4. Section 1473 of the Penal Code is amended to read:

1473. (a) A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.

(b) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:

(1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to the person's incarceration.

(2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.

(3) (A) New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.

(B) For purposes of this section, "new evidence" means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.

(c) Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).

(d) This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.

(e) (1) For purposes of this section, "false evidence" includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.

(2) This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates the original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.

(f) Notwithstanding any other law, a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745 if judgment was entered on or after January 1, 2021. A petition raising a claim of this nature for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a successive or abusive petition. If the petitioner has a habeas corpus petition pending in state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition with a claim that the petitioner's conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745. The petition shall state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner

cannot afford counsel and either the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745 or the State Public Defender requests counsel be appointed. Newly appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment. The court shall review a petition raising a claim pursuant to Section 745 and shall determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause. The defendant shall appear at the hearing by video unless counsel indicates that their presence in court is needed. If the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.

SEC. 5. Section 1473.7 of the Penal Code is amended to read:

1473.7. (a) A person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence for any of the following reasons:

(1) The conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

(2) Newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests of justice.

(3) A conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745.

(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a motion pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in criminal custody.

(2) A motion pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be deemed untimely filed if it was not filed with reasonable diligence after the later of the following:

(A) The moving party receives a notice to appear in immigration court or other notice from immigration authorities that asserts the conviction or sentence as a basis for removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.

(B) Notice that a final removal order has been issued against the moving party, based on the existence of the conviction or sentence that the moving party seeks to vacate.

(c) A motion pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall be filed without undue delay from the date the moving party discovered, or could have discovered with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence that provides a basis for relief under this section or Section 745.

(d) All motions shall be entitled to a hearing. Upon the request of the moving party, the court may hold the hearing without the personal presence of the moving party provided that it finds good cause as to why the moving party cannot be present. If the prosecution has no objection to the motion, the court may grant the motion to vacate the conviction or sentence without a hearing.

(e) When ruling on the motion:

(1) The court shall grant the motion to vacate the conviction or sentence if the moving party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of any of the grounds for relief specified in subdivision (a). For a motion made pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the moving party shall also establish that the conviction or sentence being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.

(2) There is a presumption of legal invalidity for the purposes of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) if the moving party pleaded guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to a statute that provided that, upon completion of specific requirements, the arrest and conviction shall be deemed never to have occurred, where the moving party complied with these requirements, and where the disposition under the statute has been, or potentially could be, used as a basis for adverse immigration consequences.

(3) If the court grants the motion to vacate a conviction or sentence obtained through a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court shall allow the moving party to withdraw the plea.

(4) When ruling on a motion under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the only finding that the court is required to make is whether the conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. When ruling on a motion under paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), the court shall specify the basis for its conclusion.

(f) An order granting or denying the motion is appealable under subdivision (b) of Section 1237 as an order after judgment affecting the substantial rights of a party.

(g) A court may only issue a specific finding of ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of a motion brought under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) if the attorney found to be ineffective was given timely advance notice of the motion hearing by the moving party or the prosecutor, pursuant to Section 416.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

SEC. 6. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

SEC. 7. Section 3.5 of this bill shall only become operative if Assembly Bill 3070 is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2021, in which case Section 3 of this bill shall not become operative.