

# The Framework

- *People v. Wheeler* (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 258
- *Batson v. Kentucky* (1986) 476 U.S. 79
- *Johnson v. California* (2005) 545 U.S. 162



# Public Policy Underpinnings

- Allow juries to reflect diverse beliefs to avoid tyranny of the majority
- Combat governmental oppression
- Promote perception of courts as legitimate
- Encourage citizen participation in gov't
- Stem the tide of minority stigmatization

## *People v. Wheeler*

- Article 1, Section 16 of the California Constitution contains a “right to trial by jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community . . . .” (*Id.* at 276-77.)
- Using peremptory challenges to kick jurors based solely on “group bias” violates that right. (*Id.*)

# What is “Group Bias?”

- “Group Bias”: The presumption “that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds” (*Id.* at 276)

# *Batson v. Kentucky*


- 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires that jurors not be peremptorily challenged solely based on race (or protected classification)
- Promulgated Three-Part Inquiry for Trial Court to use in monitoring a *Batson*-type challenge

# Three-Part Inquiry

- PRONG 1: Opponent must make prima facie case that *totality of circumstances* raises an inference of discriminatory kick
- PRONG 2: Burden shifts to proponent to give permissible reasons
- PRONG 3: Trial Court decides whether opponent has proven discriminatory purpose

# Prong 1: *Johnson v. California* (2005) 545 U.S. 162

- Prong 1 of the original *Wheeler* test required opponent to show “strong likelihood” that jurors being kicked due to group bias
- *Johnson* held that standard too high; CA should be using mere “inference” language of *Batson* (totality of the circumstances)



# Prong 1: Tips & Strategies for Making the Prima Facie Case

- Make TC put on record whether finding Prima Facie case

--If does not expressly so find, and you begin giving your reasons, Prong 1 will be deemed MOOT on appeal

- If TC finds no prima facie case, ask to put your classification-neutral reasons on record for purposes of appeal

--If says no, file them in a written declaration

## Prong 2: Enunciation of Neutral Reasons

- Calmly remember and state your reasons
- Put your evidence on the record (see *infra* re: Comparative Analysis, etc.)
- And if you absolutely can't remember your reasons... see *Gonzalez v. Brown* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009) 585 F.3d 1202

(finding that while not forgetting is preferable, a TC can still credit as neutral a reason not stated b/c attorney can't remember the reason for the kick when other factors showed the attorney to be non-discriminatory, such as (a) remembering neutral reasons for kicking others in the class, (b) not kicking many in the class, and (c) having others in the class remain on the panel)

## Prong 3: Weighing the Scales




- Third prong is a credibility determination
- It “demands of the trial judge a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate” the truthfulness of the proffered race-neutral reason

*(People v. Hall* (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 161, 167)


# Who Can Make the Motion?

- Either the prosecution or the defense can bring a *Batson* motion. (*Georgia v. McCollum* (1992) 505 U.S. 42.)
- Doesn't matter if D and the challenged juror share the same classification or not. (*Powers v. Ohio* (1991) 499 U.S. 400.)





# Mechanics and Timing

- Best practice: make motion at bench
  - Consider limine
- Hearing: outside jury's presence
- Too late to *Wheeler* if jury AND alternates sworn
- But can still *Wheeler* as to entire panel if alternates not yet sworn
- Reasons cannot be given ex parte



# What is a “Cognizable Group”?




# Cognizable Groups: Per Case Law and CCP 231.5

- Race/Color/Ethnicity
- Sex
- National Origin
- Sex in combination w/  
Race/Ethnicity, etc.
- Religious Affiliation  
(note the difference of  
kicking someone who,  
due to religious views,  
can't sit in judgment—  
that's ok)
- Sexual Orientation
- “Similar Grounds”

# Non-Cognizable Groups

- Age (Young and Old)
- People newly residing in the community
- “People of Color” as a combined group

*People v. Davis* (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 539; *People v. Neuman* (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 571



# What are “similar grounds”?

- Hard to find a case law definition that’s cited with regularity

(see *People v. Garcia* (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1269, 1275-76 (drawing upon a Cal. Sup. plurality opinion’s definition in the absence of something with more authority))

## “Similar Grounds”: Federal

- Here’s a pre-*Batson* definition in grand jury context: whether “the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.”


(*Castaneda v. Partida* (1977) 430 U.S. 482, 494; see *Garcia, supra*, at 1273 (noting that this is likely the US Supreme’s standard b/c they cited this case in *Batson*)

## “Similar Grounds”: State

- CCP 231.5 was meant “to codify the decision in” *Garcia*.  
(CAL. CODE CIV. PROC 231.5 (2000 Note).)
- *Garcia* recites plurality language in *Rubio v. Superior Court*, (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 93, suggesting the following as the first prong of a two-prong definition:
- Groups whose members “share a common perspective arising from their life experience in the group, i.e., a perspective gained precisely because they are members of that group.”  
(*Garcia, supra*, at 1276 (quoting *Rubio* (lead op.), *supra*, at 98).)

# “Similar Grounds”: State

(cont’d)



- *Garcia* notes the *Rubio* court gave a two-prong test, but only the first part seemed to have majority support
- Still, *Garcia* also used the second prong in its analysis (“that no other members of the community are capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group in question”) (*Id.* at 1278 (quoting *Rubio*, *supra*, at 98)

# Religion: *People v. Jones* (2011) 51 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 346

- Where P excused black juror partly b/c she attended the 1<sup>st</sup> A.M.E. Church, which P called a “controversial” organization, and said he didn’t want anyone “controversial” . . .
- Cal Sup’s said P “did not excuse her because of her religious views but because he believed she belonged to a controversial organization.” (*Id.* at 368.)

# Bilinguals #1: *Hernandez v. New York* (1991) 500 U.S. 352

## **\*\*PLURALITY OPINION\*\***


- 4-justice opinion stated the Trial Court did not commit clear error in believing DA's claim that he kicked the Spanish-speaking jurors because they gave him reason to think they would reject the interpreter's version in favor of their own, and not because he wanted Latinos off the jury
- BUT: "[A] policy of striking all who speak a given language, without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination. But that case is not before us." (*Id.* at 371-72.)

## Bilinguals #2: *People v. Cardenas* (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1468

- Recognized the U.S. Supreme Court's plurality in *Hernandez*
- Upheld the TC's decision that "the prosecutor had put forth a valid, race-neutral reason for excluding" the Spanish-speaking jurors on grounds DA thought they'd reject the official translation, and not as a pretext for racial kick

# Bilinguals #3: *P. v. Gonzales* (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 620

- BUT SEE *People v. Gonzales*, where DDA stated several reasons to kick the juror, including his fear the juror would reject the official interpreter's version...
- But the record did not support that fear and also didn't support the other stated reasons, so appellate court found TC erred in accepting DDA's stated reasons
- As the appellate court said, "the stated basis is strongly suspicious of being a ruse for excusing those persons who may be perceived as more closely identifying with their national origin and/or their Hispanic ethnicity, i.e., those who still speak Spanish." (*Id.* at 631.)



# Statistics, Comparative Analysis, and Disparate Questioning

New Forms of Evidence to Prove  
or Disprove Discriminatory Intent


*Miller-El v. Dretke* (2005)  
545 U.S. 231

The Majority Used the Following  
Methods to Find the Stated Race-  
Neutral Reasons to be Pretextual

## *Miller-E/ (cont'd)*

### Statistics


P struck 91% of black potential jurors, but  
only 12% of non-black potential jurors



## *Miller-E/ (cont'd)*

# Disparate Questioning

P pressed black potential jurors harder in questioning



Also, asked trick questions of them more often

# *Miller-E/ (cont'd)*

Evidence of Past DA's Office  
Policy of Jury Selection  
Discrimination



Testimony of former prosecutors of office  
climate of race-based voir dire

Prosecutor-written manual discussing  
types of people not to choose



## *Miller-E/ (cont'd)*

# Notation of Race on Jury Selection Cards

P annotated race on cards; but trial was before *Batson*, so Ct. not impressed with excuse of annotating to avoid *Batson* error

## *Miller-E/ (cont'd)*

# Comparative Analysis


Compared P's stated reasons for striking black potential jurors

If same quality applied to non-black potential jurors whom P didn't strike, evidence of discrimination

*Miller-EI (cont'd)*

# Cumulative Weight of All-of-the-Above

Court put all the puzzle pieces together and  
didn't like what it saw





# *Miller-EI's Progeny*

Fleshing Out the New  
Evidence Rules

*Williams v. Runnels* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006)

432 F.3d 1102

Bare Statistics OK to  
Establish Prong 1's Prima  
Facie Case


# *Williams v. Runnels: Make Your Record!*

- TC found no Prima Facie case
- P tried to put reasons on record, just in case, for appeal
- 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit said it was P's responsibility to make record, b/c prima facie case was shown
- Guess what? P no longer remembered why.
- TC said no thanks

# *Snyder v. Louisiana* (2008) 552 U.S.

## 472: Ask Follow-Up Q's

- Court suggests P should have followed up with more Q's when black potential juror's hardship request was denied after school said service ok
- P said kicked b/c thought juror would still worry; but no follow-up Q's, so Ct. disbelieved P
- Further, others whose hardships were denied were not stricken by P...and they were white



# *People v. Lenix* (2008)

44 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 602

- Cal Sup's Recognize Comparative Analysis Required for First Time on Appeal
- So long as record contains enough information to so engage

# Lenix: Make Your Record

- Cal Sup's prefer we make our own record and do our own Comparative Analysis at trial

- So that "defendant can make an inclusive record, [and] the prosecutor can respond to the alleged similarities"

(*Id.* at 624.)




# Lenix: Don't Cut Off Voir Dire Time

Lenix recognizes TC's CCP 223 power to limit voir dire time, but said this:

"If the trial court truncates the time available or otherwise overly limits voir dire, unfair conclusions might be drawn based on the advocate's perceived failure to follow up or ask questions."


(*Id.* at 625.)



# *Lenix and Green v. Lamarque:*

## Notations on Juror Cards

- *Lenix*: Dicta re: *Miller-E*'s disapproval of race notations on juror cards:
- "We emphasize, however, that post-*Batson*, recording the race of each juror is an important tool to be used by the court and counsel in mounting, refuting or analyzing a *Batson* challenge." (*Id.* at 617 n.12.)
- BUT SEE *Green v. Lamarque* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008) 532 F.3d 1028, 1033, finding a *Batson* violation because, inter alia, "the prosecutor had noted the race of each venire member he struck from the jury pool; when the trial judge asked him who he struck and why, the prosecutor was able to read off a list," then cited *Miller-E*'s note of that.




# Rice v. Collins (2006)

## 546 U.S. 333

- US Supremes *unanimously* overturned 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit for going too far in second-guessing TC's 3<sup>rd</sup> prong credibility determination
- US Sup's Used Comp. Analysis as a Shield rather than a Sword
- Noted P struck similarly situated white potential juror (challenge on appeal was to strike of black potential juror)

# Comparative Analysis Tips & Strategies



- Keep a list of the attributes leading you to kick
- If you saved someone with that attribute, have a list of why you kept them

# Comparative Analysis Tips & Strategies


- Don't wait for D; make your own Comp. Analysis argument, or App. Ct. will draw judgment on an artificially short record
- Shield rather than a Sword—point out when you kicked others w/same attribute



# Other New Evidence Forms


## Tips & Strategies

- Ask follow-up Q's—or point out that Trial Court kept strict timetable and you didn't have time
- Bring a calculator to do statistics



# Demeanor Strikes and the Cold Appellate Record

So what happens when you kick  
because of the juror's demeanor,  
but that demeanor is not reflected  
in the record?



# App. Ct.'s Dislike Demeanor Strikes w/o Record Support




- *People v. Silva* (2001) 25 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 345  
(reversed death penalty when P's non-demeanor reasons belied by record, and demeanor reason not supported by it)


- *Snyder v. Louisiana, supra*  
(reversed where P gave 2 reasons, 1 of which belied by Comp. Analysis and 1 was demeanor not in record; TC didn't state which it credited)



# Vague Demeanor Reasons Unsupported by Record

- *People v. Allen* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 542  
(reversed where P gave demeanor  
reason of “her very response to your  
answers, and her demeanor, and . . .  
how she took her seat” being indicative  
of an independent thinker; App. Ct. had  
no idea what P was talking about)





## A Ray of Hope...

### But Don't Forget *Habeas*


- *People v. Reynoso* (2003) 31 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 903  
(accepted TC's non-detailed credibility ruling when P's demeanor reason not in record but P's other reason not belied by it)
- NOTE: *Reynoso* can be a helpful decision, but the better practice is to make a demeanor record and have TC give a detailed ruling. Leave no stone unturned.

# Another Ray of Hope—From the Supremes! *Thaler v. Haynes*

- Sup's upheld TC's crediting of P's race-neutral demeanor even when the TC wasn't the judge who was present for voir dire, and therefore couldn't have seen the complained-of demeanor.
- "[T]he best evidence of the intent of the attorney exercising a strike is often that attorney's demeanor." (*Id.* (2010) 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1175, \_\_ U.S. \_\_.

## *Thaler v. Haynes (cont'd)*

- While “the trial judge’s ‘first hand observations’ are of great importance,” *Batson* does not “hold that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not observe or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor.” *Id.* at 1174-75, U.S. at \_.
- But Note: *Haynes* involved no evidence in the record that would have undermined the prosecutor’s stated reasons.



## Demeanor-Based Tips & Strategies

- Weave your observations into voir dire record

*-“I realized you were smiling at D. I’m curious as to why?”*

*-“You seem a little upset with me. Have we met before?”*

*-“So I noticed you looking around during questioning. Is there something else on your mind besides these proceedings?”*




# Demeanor-Based Tips & Strategies

- During 2<sup>nd</sup> Prong, specifically ask TC to tell you whether she/he saw the same thing you did
  - “Did the Court also see that Juror A kept coming in late after the breaks?”*
  - “Does the Court agree with my observation that Juror A rolled his eyes when the bailiff asked him to take his hat off?”*

# Demeanor-Based Tips & Strategies

- App. Ct.'s won't consider a reason that you didn't give (and TC can't, either)  
(*Paulino v. Castro* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1083)
- So make sure you give all your reasons
- Make TC specify its findings—which reasons accepting, and which rejecting




# Demeanor-Based Tips & Strategies

- Consider turning chair around and watching panel from minute they walk in until the first 12 are seated in the box
  - It might look weird, but panel will think you're conscientious and care who is selected
  - You won't miss anything—who is snoozing, who won't let others squeeze past them, who didn't take hat off until admonished, etc.

# Demeanor-Based Tips & Strategies


- Keep ALL your jury notes—for retained jurors as well as kicked jurors
- If remanded to do Prong 2, you can't rebut prima facie case if you can't remember your reasons

(*Paulino v. Harrison* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008) 542 F.3d 692)



# Remedies

(Yes, we're almost done!)






# The Good, Old-Fashioned Remedies

- *Wheeler*. Dismiss entire panel and start over with new panel
- *Batson*: US Supremes remanded to allow TC to engage in 3-Part Inquiry
- Because opponent “is entitled to a random draw from an entire venire—not one that has been partially or totally stripped of members of a cognizable group . . . .” (*Wheeler*, *supra*, at 282.)
- EXPLICITLY LEFT OPEN
  - Discharging entire panel and starting over
  - Re-seating the offended juror

*Wheeler Gone Wild:  
People v. Willis (2002)  
27 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 811*



But what if the opponent doesn't  
*want* to dismiss the panel?  
Opponent holds all the cards...


# *Willis: Wheeler Gone Wild*

- Defense attorney purposely violated *Wheeler* b/c didn't like mostly white panel
- Rather than reward defense w/ new panel, TC fined defense attorney \$1500 as an alternate remedy
- (To the chagrin of the higher courts, TC later vacated the sanction order)




# *Willis: Cal Sup's Expand Wheeler's Remedies*

- Cal Sup's affirmed use of \$\$ sanctions
- Gave nod to re-seating offended juror
- Hinted ok to give opponent extra peremptories instead of re-seating, if offended juror already gone (dicta)
- **THE CATCH:** the opponent has to AGREE to the alternative remedy. **OPPONENT HOLDS THE CARDS.**



# Potential State Bar Reporting Requirements



# State Bar Reporting: At Trial

- BP 6086.7(a)(3): TC must report if monetarily sanctions you for \$1000 or more
- BP 6068(o)(3): You must report self w/in 30 days if TC monetarily sanctions you for \$1000 or more

# State Bar Reporting: On Appeal

- BP 6086.7(a)(2): TC must report if judgment reversed “in whole or in part” b/c of attorney misconduct
- BP 6068(o)(7): You must report self w/in 30 days if judgment reversed “in whole or in part” b/c of misconduct

# State Bar Reporting: On Appeal

cont'd

- Coleman thinks *Wheeler* error means attorney made Jury Trial unfair--and if pretext finding, deceptive; thinks reporting duty.

(JERRY P. COLEMAN, MR. WHEELER GOES TO WASHINGTON--THE FULL FEDERALIZATION OF JURY CHALLENGE PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA 43 (2006))